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IV 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION'S PAYMENT OF WILLIAMS'S BENEFITS TO HIM 
AT THE ADDRESS OF THE WILLIAMS TRUST COMPLIES WITH 
SECTION 34A-2-422 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
The Commission argues that section 34A-2-422 of the Utah Code is "plain, 
unambiguous, and mandatory." (Comm'n. Br. at 10.) Florida Asset Financing 
Corporation ("FAFC") agrees that this Court need look no further than the plain language 
of the statute to decide this dispute. Because FAFC is not attempting to make a claim on, 
garnish, or attach any workers' compensation benefits before payment to Williams, this 
Court should reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
A. FAFC is Not Making a "Claim" Against the Benefits Before Payment 
to Williams, 
Characterizing FAFC's loan to Williams as, among other things, an "artifice," 
"scheme," and "elaborate plan," the Commission contends that FAFC is making a 
"claim" on Williams's compensation before it is paid to him. (Comm'n. Br. at 8-9, 11.) 
Despite the Commission's baseless accusations, the Williams Trust and the Irrevocable 
Letter of Direction, both of which Williams voluntarily signed, comply with the plain 
language of the statute. Section 34A-2-422 makes "compensation before payment" 
exempt from all "claims of creditors." The statute, however, does not define the term 
"claim." This Court has defined a "claim" as "the aggregate of operative facts which 
give rise to a right enforceable in the courts." Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). This definition of "claim," as 
applied to section 34A-2-422, is consistent with the terms surrounding it in the statute — 
"attachment" and "execution" — which are remedies available under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to seize or otherwise secure property. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64, 69.] See 
also Morton Int% Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991) (stating 
that "the meaning of questionable words and phrases in a statute may be ascertained by 
reference to words or phrases associated with them"). Thus, the question is whether 
FAFC is asserting a "right" to receive any portion of Williams's compensation before it is 
paid to Williams. As set forth below, FAFC makes no such claim to any 
"[compensation before payment" to Williams. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-422. 
By enforcing its rights in the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, FAFC is not making 
a "claim" against any workers' compensation before it is paid to Williams. The subject 
of section 34A-2-422 is "compensation." It is "compensation before payment" that is 
exempt from claims of creditors. Id. (emphasis added). FAFC does not seek to enforce 
any right to receive any portion of Williams's compensation before it is paid to Williams. 
Rather, consistent with section 34A-2-422, FAFC merely seeks to have the Commission 
send the compensation to Williams at the address of the Williams Trust, in accordance 
with the Irrevocable Letter of Direction, which Williams himself voluntarily signed. 
In its brief, the Commission does not contend that FAFC is attempting to "attach" 
or "execute" against any disability benefits before payment. 
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Simply stated, FAFC is not making, and has never made, a "claim" against any workers' 
compensation benefits before the compensation is paid to Williams. 
B, The Disability Benefits Are Being Paid to Williams, 
Next, the Commission argues that the compensation is "never paid to Mr. 
Williams, but is remitted directly to Florida Asset." (Comm'n. Br. at 12.) The 
Commission, however, cites no record support for this assertion. In any event, the statute 
requires that compensation be paid to "employees" or their dependents. Under the 
Williams Trust, Williams irrevocably declared that certain benefits be paid to him, not to 
FAFC. (R. 116, 128.) Again, FAFC does not receive any funds until after Williams 
receives his workers' compensation benefits in care of the Trust. Thus, payment of 
Williams's compensation to him, at the address designated in the trust documents, 
complies with the language of the statute. 
C. The Commission's Actions in this Case Show that Making Payments to 
Williams in Care of the Trust is Consistent With Section 34A-2-422. 
As discussed in FAFC's principal brief, the Commission's practice is to send the 
compensation to the address designated by the recipient, even if that address is not the 
recipient's home address. For over four years, the Commission paid Williams's benefits 
to him in care of the Williams Trust. Also, in March 2001, just before Williams filed his 
bankruptcy petition, the Commission told FAFC that it intended to comply with 
Williams's directions to pay the compensation to him in care of the Williams Trust, as the 
Fifth Judicial District Court had ordered him to do. (R. at 38-43.) In the future, if 
Williams were to comply with the multiple, unappealed court orders entered against him 
by instructing the Commission to send the benefits to him in care of the Williams Trust, 
the Commission likely would comply with his instructions. 
If one accepts the Commission's argument that payment to Williams in care of the 
Williams Trust does not comply with the statute, then one also would expect the 
Commission to refuse to send the payments to the Trust address under any circumstances. 
Carrying the Commission's argument to its logical conclusion, Williams would have no 
power to designate that his payments be sent to him in care of the Trust: the payments 
would always be sent to his home address, regardless of Williams's instructions. Yet, 
that is not what section 34A-2-422 requires, and that has not been the Commission's 
practical interpretation of the statute. The actions of the Commission, which is the entity 
charged with administering Utah's workers' compensation laws (Comm'n. Br. at 19), 
unequivocally demonstrate that sending Williams's compensation to him in care of the 
Williams Trust is consistent with section 34A-2-422. 
If the Commission wishes to prevent a beneficiary from having his compensation 
sent to him in care of a trust, the Commission must voice its concerns to the Utah 
Legislature to enact a more specific, and more stringent, statute exempting benefits after 
they are paid to the recipient. See, e.g., Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor 
2
 The Commission does not argue that Labor Commission Rule 612-1-6(A), which 
was cited by the court of appeals, would prohibit payment of Williams's compensation to 
him in care of the Williams Trust. 
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Comm'n, 2004 UT App 273, f 15, 98 P.3d 436 (citing statutes from other jurisdictions 
protecting workers' compensation benefits "before and/or after they are received by the 
worker"). See also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 
1980) (stating that if Industrial Commission believed "that the law should be different, 
perhaps that should be addressed to the legislature, whose function and prerogative it is to 
make changes or clarifications in the law"). As presently enacted, however, section 34A-
2-422 does not prohibit Williams's compensation to be mailed to him in care of the 
Williams Trust, as Williams himself voluntarily directed. Rather, the statute prohibits 
only general unsecured creditors from attaching or executing against Williams's 
compensation before it is paid to him. Because FAFC is not a general creditor seeking to 
make a claim on, attach, or execute against Williams's benefits, this Court should reverse 
the court of appeals' decision. 
D. Because the Commission's Arguments Fail to Address the Assignability 
of Workers' Compensation Benefits, this Court Should Affirm the 
Court of Appeals' Decision that the Statute Does Not Prohibit 
Assignments, 
As stated above, FAFC did not acquire an assignment of Williams's disability 
benefits. Its only "assignment" rights were in the beneficial interest in the Williams 
Trust, where the payments to Williams were to be sent pursuant to the Irrevocable Letter 
of Direction. (R. at 116-28.) Nowhere in its brief does the Commission address the court 
of appeals' analysis regarding the "assignability" of compensation under the statute. It is 
"well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not 
adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Thus, this Court 
should affirm the court of appeals' determination that section 34A-2-422 does not 
prohibit "assignments" relating to the payment of workers' compensation benefits. See 
Florida Asset Finan. Corp., 2004 UT App 273 at t 14. 
II. ALTHOUGH THE COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER "PUBLIC POLICY" 
GIVEN THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE, FAFC'S 
CONTRACT WITH WILLIAMS IS CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC 
POLICY. 
Despite its acknowledgement that section 34A-2-422 is "clear" and 
"unambiguous," the Commission goes on to argue that "public policy" supports its 
position about how the statute should be interpreted. (Comm'n. Br. at 15-19.) When the 
language of a statute "'is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). Thus, "it is 
elementary" that this Court does "not seek guidance from legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations when the statute is clear and unambiguous." Id.; see also Perrine v. 
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) ("Only when we find 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations."). In light of the statute's unambiguous 
language, this Court should decline the Commission's invitation to consider "public 
policy" to resolve this dispute. 
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Even if this Court considers the Commission's arguments regarding "public 
policy," these policy factors support the conclusion that Williams is free to use his 
workers' compensation benefits however he chooses. As this Court has declared, 
benefits received under the workers' compensation system may properly be used to 
obtain credit and pay creditors. See Parker v. Industrial Comm 'n, 87 Utah 868, 50 P.2d 
278, 278 (1935) ("Certainly, there is nothing which prevents an injured employee from 
using his compensation to pay his creditors."); see also Sullo v. Cinco Star, Inc., 755 So. 
2d 822, 823 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) ("The beneficiary may preserve or squander the 
proceeds; he or she is in total control."); Highland Park State Bank v. Salazar, 555 
S.W.2d 484, 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that a beneficiary is free to use workers' 
compensation benefits "to provide food, shelter and other necessities" or "he may use it 
as collateral to secure repayment of a loan"). In this case, Williams chose to use a 
portion of his compensation to facilitate a loan transaction with FAFC, an entirely proper 
use of his benefits. 
The Commission further contends that Utah's workers' compensation laws protect 
the "stream of income" to injured workers and that "lump-sum payments" are proper only 
in "special circumstances," as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421. (Comm'n. 
Br. at 16-17.) In the first instance, the Commission does not argue that FAFC's loan to 
Williams constituted a "lump-sum payment" of his workers' compensation benefits that 
was subject to approval by the Commission. Indeed, the Trust documents contemplate 
that Williams will continue to receive his periodic disability payments, which are made to 
Williams in care of the Trustee of the Williams Trust. 
Second, in about August 2001, long after this dispute arose, the Commission gave 
Williams a six-month advance on his benefits. (R. at 43.) There is no evidence in the 
record that any administrative law judge approved the six-month "lump-sum payment" to 
Williams. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421 ("An administrative law judge, under 
special circumstances and when the same is deemed advisable, may commute periodic 
benefits to one or more lump-sum payments."). Nor is there any evidence about what 
"special circumstances" may have justified such a payment. See id. Thus, under the facts 
of this case, the Commission's argument that only "special circumstances" support lump-
sum payments is unpersuasive. 
Finally, as noted by the New Mexico Supreme Court in interpreting a workers' 
compensation statute almost identical to section 34A-2-422, "[i]f the legislature had 
intended a 'spendthrift' provision that would preclude the assignment of all or part of the 
proceeds before received, such a provision readily could have been articulated." Romero 
v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808, 811 (N.M. 1991). Similarly, neither the plain language of section 
34A-2-422 nor "public policy" suggests that the Utah Legislature intended anything other 
than to protect workers' compensation from involuntary claims, attachment, or execution 
by the general creditors of an injured worker. Again, if the Commission wishes to 
prohibit voluntary transactions, such as that entered into between Williams and FAFC, it 
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should make its wishes known to the legislature. In sum, the Commission's "public 
policy" arguments cannot override the plain language of the statute, which allows 
Williams to receive his workers' compensation benefits in care of the Williams Trust. 
III. THE COMMISSION HAS NO LEGAL BASIS TO REFUSE TO PAY 
WILLIAMS'S COMPENSATION TO HIM IN CARE OF THE WILLIAMS 
TRUST. 
The Commission does not independently address the second issue on this appeal: 
whether the Commission itself can be required to "direct payments to a trust for 
subsequent transfer to a creditor." As argued in FAFC's principal brief, because the 
Commission's payment of workers' compensation benefits to Williams in care of the 
Williams Trust does not violate section 34A-2-422, the Commission should have no 
concern about paying the benefits in the manner voluntarily prescribed by Williams in his 
Irrevocable Letter of Direction. Indeed, the Commission's only stated justification for 
refusing to send the benefits to Williams at the Trust address has been its position that 
section 34A-2-422 prohibits such action. Section 34A-2-422, however, contains no such 
prohibition. 
Finally, there is no dispute between Williams and FAFC over the enforceability of 
the Williams Trust or the Irrevocable Letter of Direction. Despite having several 
opportunities to voice his objections in three separate Utah courts, Williams has never 
challenged the enforceability of these documents. The Default Judgment entered againsl 
Williams in this action, which has never been set aside or appealed, permits FAFC to 
instruct the Commission to send Williams's benefits to him at the Trust address. (R. at 
206-08.) Thus, as the third-party payor of the compensation, the Commission has no 
legal basis to refuse to comply with Williams's irrevocable directions to send his 
compensation to him in care of the Williams Trust. 
CONCLUSION 
FAFC respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. In addition, as requested in its principal brief, FAFC respectfully requests that 
the Court remand this case to the court of appeals with instructions to enter an order (1) 
affirming the Order and Judgment entered by the district court and (2) remanding the case 
to the district court to conduct such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the 
Order and Judgment, including augmenting the Judgment entered in favor of FAFC. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of July 2005. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
w -
Mark R. Gaylord 
Craig H. Howe 
Matthew L. Moncur 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Florida Asset Financing Corporation 
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